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RATE MAKING AND JUDICIAL REVIEW"
"P ERHAPS the most engrossing topic of discussion in the last
Ifew months, is the subject of fixing rates to be charged by pub-
lic utilities. There has been so much confusion and apparent mis-
understanding on the subject, that it might be of interest to discuss
with you, a body of lawyers, some aspects of rate making and regula-
tion in so far as the federal courts are concerned.
"The legal theories and the technique of procedure for ascer-
tainment of what is a case of confiscation of a business devoted to a
public use or service, should be of interest to any group of lawyers.
It is the duty of lawyers to advise the public of the ways of the law,
and surely you should make use of this opportunity to correct some
very wrong impressions created by the public press on this phase of
our constitutional protection.
"Article 3 of the Constitution of the United States provides that
the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such inferior courts as Congress may, from time to time,
ordain or establish. Section 2 of that article provides that the judi-
cial power shall extend to all cases in law and in equity arising under
the Constitution, the laws of the United States, &c. And the Four-
teenth Amendment forbids any state to make or enforce any laws
which shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without
due process of law or deny to any person within its jurisdiction, the
equal protection of the law. It is the deprivation of property, with-
out due process of law, that warrants the public utilities to make
contest against any state regulatory bodies created by statute when
the rates fixed by those bodies constitute a confiscation of property.
"As long as there is a district court of the United States or a
circuit court of appeals, both of which have been ordained and es-
tablished, the injunctive power of either or both will survive and may
be used by any utility in protection of its property where an attempt
is made to fix rates which, if enforced, would amount to confiscation
of property. It is difficult for any student of the law, certainly im-
possible for a constitutional lawyer, to conceive of any way that Con-
gress may take from the federal courts their power and duty to pro-
tect property about to be confiscated by regulation of any state or
municipality.
"The law has placed safeguards about the constitutional protec-
tion given property. In rate making controversies or whenever the
constitution is brought into question'in a case in the district court,
the law requires the judge presiding to call to his assistance two other
judges, one of whom must be a Supreme Court justice or a circuit
* Address delivered before the Unity Club, Brooklyn, N. Y.. on March 4th
by Hon. Martin T. Manton, Judge of the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals (2nd Circuit).
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judge and so there is formed the so-called 'statutory court,' to which
we have heard frequent reference. This is provided for by the
U. S. Civil Code, Sec. 266.1 The law provides a direct appeal, as a
matter of right, to the Supreme Court from any decision rendered
by the so-called 'statutory court.' The Supreme Court has estab-
lished very definite rules for the judicial process, once it is put into
operation, in confiscation cases.
"Rate making and, more strictly speaking, rate regulation by
public authority in the United States, was established more than half
a century ago. On Mlrch 1, 1877, in Munn v. Illinois,2 the Supreme
Court for the first time decided that private property devoted to
public use is subject to public regulation and it was more than 200
years prior to that time that Lord Chief Justice Hale of England
pointed out in a treatise, DePortibus Mars, that when private prop-
erty is affected by public interest, it ceases to be private property only.
"The efficient and impartial enforcement of the rights of a state
or municipality and its inhabitants, in order to obtain adequate service
at fair uniform rates, is just as essential, as if indeed it is not more
necessary, than providing the necessary power and authority in the
first instance, to insure such service for itself and its citizens. The
strict persistent enforcement of the law and the franchise or contract
rights available to the municipality and the rights of its inhabitants
under indeterminate permits and commission regulation, is generally
found necessary to secure satisfactory service at a fair uniform rate.
The underlying principle is that business of certain kinds holds such
a peculiar relation to public interest, that there is superintroduced
upon it the right of public regulation.
"The law has long been established providing a fair return on
a rate based on capital invested in property devoted to and used in
public service. The rate of return must be fair. The right to regu-
late rates is based fundamentally upon the exercise of the police power
of the state. That is the power of government which is inherent in
every sovereignty. It is the power to govern men and things, and
while it is exercised for the common good, the police power of a state
is not unlimited. Its use is always subject to judicial review and
when exercised in an arbitrary or oppressive manner, it is without
due process of law and such action may be annulled as violative of
the rights protected by the constitution. Therefore, it is observable
that in granting this protection of the national constitution, the ques-
I "No interlocutory injunction suspending or restraining the enforcement,
operation or execution of any statute of a state by restraining the** * enforce-
ment of an order made by an administrative board or commission *** shall be
issued or granted * * * unless the application for the same shall be presented
to a justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, or to a circuit or
district judge, and shall be heard and determined by three judges, of whom at
least one shall be a justice of the Supreme Court or a circuit judge and the
other two may be either circuit or district judges, and unless a majority of
said three judges shall concur in granting such application." Section 266 of
the Judicial Code (28 U. S. C. A., Sec. 380).294U. S. 113.
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tions involved are essentially questions of federal law and particu-
larly of injunctive relief, both of which are primarily subjects for
interpretation and construction by the national courts.
"Rates for public utilities must be calculated on a rate base which
is the fair value of the property devoted to the public service, used
and useful, and such fair value is determined by giving to all relevant
matters such weight as may be right and just in each case. The leading
case on this subject was considered by the Supreme Court in 1898.3
There the public was asking that the rate base be measured by repro-
duction cost and the railroad companies were asking that they be al-
lowed to earn on a rate base measured by the outstanding securities
on their property which outstanding securities they claimed repre-
sented their original investment thereon. The Court laid down the
so-called 'fair value rule' saying that reproduction costs would be
unjust to the railroad because it would not reflect honest investment
prudently made, but it held that the basis of calculation as to the
reasonableness of rates to be charged must be the fair value of the
property being used by it for the convenience of the public and that
in order to estimate such value, the original cost of construction, the
amounts expended in public improvements, the amount and value of
its bonds and stocks, the present as compared with the original cost
of construction, the probable earning capacity of the property under
the rates prescribed by statute, and the sum required to meet the
operating expenses, were all matters for consideration to be given
just and equitable weight under the circumstances. The Court an-
nounced the rule that the company was entitled to a fair return on
the value of the property which it employed for publia convenience
and put forth the doctrine that the public is entitled to demand, on
the other hand, that no more be exacted from it for the use of a
public utility than the services rendered by it are reasonably worth.
"While many rate cases have gone to the Supreme Court since
that decision, an examination of them will find that this pioneer case
has been departed from very little. New considerations, of course,
were necessary to consider and it is as to these that the Court has
formulated additional rules for the guidance of the public utilities
commissions and the courts. A study of these cases convincingly
shows that the Court does not concern itself primarily with the ques-
tion whether a particular method of valuation has been followed but
with the question whether, upon the entire record before it, it appears
that a just measure for the rates under consideration has been
adopted. The Court considers each case in the light of its own par-
ticular facts and adopts no exclusive yard stick for the determination
of the rate base except that which is controlled by equity.
"The Public Service Commission is not a court; it is a fact-find-
ing body charged with the duty of administering the law. There is
always a rate which is just and reasonable as between the public
utility and the public, and it is this rate which the commission should
'Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 418 (1898).
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strive to ascertain and order. Rates fixed by it must not be so low
al to cross the line of confiscation and ordinarily they should not
closely approach that line. On the other hand, they should not be
so high as to be unjust and unreasonable. Rate orders to stand the
test of -the court's power to review, must find support in the evidence
introduced at the hearing. They can not be arbitrary or unsupported
by evidence. They must follow and not disregard both the law and
the evidence; they must be reasonable and not capricious and they
must prescribe rates which are non-confiscatory. They must not in-
terfere with sound business judgment and good management on tie
part of the owners of the utility property.
"The rate making power being an exercise of the police powers
of the state, is a legislative power. Therefore, it is through the rate-
making function exercised directly by the legislature that a regulatory
body is created to whom the power of making rates is delegated by
the legislature. Thus it is that the police power of the state is exer-
cised by the legislature through its agency, the regulatory body. But
its action is limited by the Constitution of the United States and the
Constitution of the state where it functions. Of course, the regu-
latory body is further limited in the use of legislative power delegated
to it by the requirement enjoined on it in the legislative enactment
creating it. Therefore, a regulatory rate order is of the same force
as the legislative enactment and is subject to the same limitations.
"The Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution,
through the due process and equal protection clauses, provides two
important limitations of state legislative power. It is because of
these that all legislative enactments and likewise all regulatory rate
orders which are foreign to or infringe upon these two clauses
or either of them, are void and may be annulled by an injunction
in the federal courts. Moreover, all legislative enactments and
all regulatory rate orders which transcend the limitations of the
state constitution and all rate orders which fail to meet the require-
ments enjoined in the enactment creating the regulatory body, are
void. A regulatory body or commission is not clothed with the gen-
eral power of management incident to ownership and it is not em-
powered to substitute its judgment for that of the directors of the
company in the matters of operation. But in rate making, in deter-
mining the rate base, it is also not empowered to substitute in whole
or in part, any other type or construction of plant for that under
investigation.
"The Commission has no power to make findings and issue or-
ders except upon compliance with the course of procedure and the
rules and decision prescribed in the state regulatory law under which
it functions. The Commission's right to act depends upon compli-
ance with requirements of the statute as to notice and hearings. It
must grant a full hearing which must be adequate and fair and its
findings must rest upon the evidence introduced and the evidence
must show the existing or proposed rates to be unreasonable in order
that they may be changed up or down, and failure on the part of the
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Commission to make reasonable compliance with those statutory re-
quirements, invalidates the order. The Commission 'has no power
to lessen the value of utility property or to make deductions from its
value on the assumption that customers through the payment for
service are making contributions to depreciation, or other expenses
or to the capital of the company nor because of some assumed rela-
tion existing between the utility company and its customers, for that
does not exist.
"These principles find support in the Supreme Court decisions
and make it clear that the Commission has no power to prescribe
confiscatory returns or an inadequate rate of return. For this would
be a violation of the due process clause and the limitation of legis-
lative power. One thing is certain and it is that the Commission
engaged in fixing public utility service rates must give heed to the
decisions of the United States Supreme Court in relation to rate
making and conduct such investigation or inquiry and authorize such
rate orders as under the decisions of that Court, the utility company
and the public are entitled to have made.
"In recent years, the state which is the depository of the sovereign
will and power of the people, has exercised its rights to enter the
business of furnishing public utility services. When it does, the
public is entitled to the same protection as in the case of private
ownership. At other times, instead of doing so and instead of exer-
cising its right of government ownership, it sometimes provides for
the creation of public service corporations and it grants to them the
right to furnish utility service at a profit. It endows upon them cer-
tain powers and clothes their business with valuable rights and privi-
leges. These are creatures of the state. They live and exist upon
the hypothesis that they will be a public benefit and confer benefits
upon the public. They are not organized for the purpose of specu-
lating in other properties, stocks or bonds. They perform a function
of the state. Their very existence and their only powers, rights and
irivileges are derived solely from the state. They too are subject
to regulation. In the private enterprise, the owner demands the
highest profit obtainable and gets all he can. His investment is in
the perilous field of competition. He must create his own market,
procure his customers, advertise his business, assume all risks and
receive no help from the state and having received no such grants
from the state, no valued rights or privileges, he is not obliged to ask
only fair profits on the sale of his product to the public. His profit
is limited only by the laws of competition.
"In the public service business, an owner is entitled only to what
is fair and reasonable profit on the service he furnishes the public.
The corporation is performing a function of the state. The business
is permitted to be established for the benefit of the public as well as
for the pecuniary gain of the stockholders. The investment is pro-
tected against competition and clothed with the privileges of a
monopoly. The market is established, the customers have no choice
for they must use the service rendered. The corporation is given the
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right of eminent domain. It is allowed the free use of the munici-
pality's streets; it is exempt from payment of franchise taxes; it has
a uniform charge placed on the service and it is relieved from fur-
nishing gratuitous service. It is protected from all grafting politi-
cians and is clothed with the right of emergency relief in time of dis-
tress. Such rights and privileges granted to the public service cor-
porations are of great value and are to be compensated for along with
other benefits conferred upon the public service corporations. These
are economic reasons which form the basis of the decisions of the
Supreme Court granting protection on the one hand and affording
profit, and on the other hand restraining oppression and arbitrary
and excessive charges.
"Municipalities such as cities have often intervened in cases
which primarily are between the public service corporation, the utility
corporation and the regulatory body of the state. While such inter-
vention has uniformly been permitted, the Supreme Court recently
in the New York Telephone case 4 laid down the rule that the relation
between the company and its customers is not that of partners, agents
and principals or trustees and beneficiary. In Fall River Gas Co.5 it
was said that the relation between a public service corporation and the
public was not a partnership, but rather that of independent con-
tracting parties. In the New York Telephone case, the Supreme
Court pointed out that customers pay for service, not for the prop-
erty used to render, it; that the payments were not contribution to
depreciation or operating expense or to capital of the company; that
by paying the bills for service, the customers did not acquire any in-
terest, legal or equitable, in property used for their convenience or
in the funds of the company; that property paid for out of moneys
received for service belonged to the company, just as does that pur-
chased out of proceeds of its stocks and bonds.
"But in a case where the inhabitants of a municipality are di-
rectly interested, the responsibility of protecting not only its own
rights, but the rights of its inhabitants, rests upon the municipality.
With a proprietory or business power to care for its own force and
with a governmental or legislative power to care for the rights and
welfare of its inhabitants, it has been considered proper to admit
municipalities into such litigations where regulatory laws or where
rate orders are being considered. Therefore petitions to intervene
by municipalities have been uniformly granted. The public utility
corporations have a special interest for municipalities. They furnish
electricity of dependable constancy; street cars run on the public
streets and telephone service are necessary requirements for not only
the city but its inhabitants in the promotion of health, convenience
and general welfare. The responsibility of a municipality in exer-
cising its legal right of participating in rate making cases where it
and its inhabitants are affected by the rates, is commensurate both to
the value of the service and-the costs of the services to the user.
'271 U. S. 23, 46 Sup. Ct. Rep. 363 (1925).
'214 Mass. 529, 102 N. E. 475 (1913).
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"The principle that the rate base is a fair value of the used and
useful property at the time rates are fixed has been universally es-
tablished and recognized. That contemplates the time when the order
fixing the rate is made by the utility board. Prices of labor and ma-
terial and valuations of property devoted to the service fluctuate and
change with the upward or downward trend of the prices.
"Some utilities are not content with a fair return upon their
investment, not even with a fair return upon the fair value of their
properties. They seek to narrow the fair value rule laid down in
the Smyth v. Ames case. They urge that dominance be given to
reproduction costs, estimates of physical property, and then augment
those estimates with a long list of financial intangibles. The courts
have been quick to stamp with disaplSroval such items on the list of
intangibles. The rate-making case is always a contest between en-
gineers, accountants and lawyers; a contest of wits in various direc-
tions.
"But with all the efforts made to change it, Smyth v. Ames rep-
resents the rule today as it did in 1898, that fair value means under
all the facts and circumstances surrounding the particular case what
is both fair to the utilities and to the public. The 14th Amendment
in protecting the property of utilities devoted to public services, does
not always protect the utilities' actual investment in the property.
"In making rates, the Commission and the courts always make
sure that the rates are to be for the use of the property; its present
fair value recognized and it must be only such as is presently devoted
to the public service. The comparison, that is, the value fixed in the
appraisal, must be only of that property which is an instrument of
public service and that valuation must be a reasonable value. The
Supreme Court has pointed out that the ability or sagacity of the
owners of property need not be considered as an enhancement of its
value. Many relevant matters are weighed in the judicial determina-
tion of fair value. The judgment must be based upon a reasonable
basis; it can not be arbitrary or unjust. There is no particular rule
or formula. Courts do not give dominance to any method of valua-
tion or to any relevant matters under all circumstances. It is con-
cerned only in arriving at a rate base which is substantially fair and
just, both to the utility and to the public. Some matters considered
are the original cost of construction, the amount expended in per-
manent improvements, the amount of market value of bonds and
stocks, the present as compared with the original cost of construc-
tion; the probable earning capacity of property under particular rates
prescribed by the statute; the sum required to meet operating ex-
penses; appreciation and depreciation; going value; the financial his-
tory of the company; the enhancement of costs and book values are
all subjects of consideration. Going value is to be added to the
plant as a whole over the sum of the values of its component parts
which is attached to it because it is in active and useful operation and
earning a return. Good will in the ordinary sense of that term which
means an element of value arising from a well known business favor-
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ably regarded by its customers, is not included in the valuation for
rate making. Going value does not include good will. The concrete
measure of going value is generally the cost of attaching and devel-
oping the business over and above the cost of the construction of the
plant. Franchises to do business are not valuable in order to en-
hance the value of the rate base. Working capital is a proper matter
to be considered in determining the rate base. Depreciation must be
considered as well as depreciation reserve.
"What is a fair return depends upon the facts and circum-
stances surrounding the utility at the time of the inquiry. Some of
these are the risks and hazards in the business. The location where
the business is conducted; the rate usually realized upon equally
stable investments in the community; the legal rate of interest; the
money market and business conditions generally; the financial con-
nections of the utilities and the management and operative experience
of the utility. The rate of return has varied from as low as 6% to
as high as 8%, depending upon these factors. The courts can not
prescribe rates; they do not do so either in the state or federal courts.
Rate making is a function of the legislative branch of the govern-
ment. The federal courts but review rates to ascertain if the rate
fixed is confiscatory, and to be confiscatory means that if in force,
they are regarded as deprivation of the property of the utility with-
out due process of law. The trial courts exercise independent judg-
ment in reaching their conclusions; they are not bound to accept the
testimony before the utilities board. Usually a master is appointed
who hears the questions of valuation and other material evidence
e nteri'ng into the subject to determine whether the rate of return is
inadequate and therefore confiscatory.
"The Supreme Court on a review which is an absolute right of
either party, has complete freedom in reviewing each case. The trial
of a rate order case is an equity proceeding and an appeal is a proper
remedy of review.
"With these precautions to guarantee constitutional protection,
both the utility and the public can rest with the security that justice
will be done in any controverted matter that reaches the federal
courts.I "The right of review of orders of a utility board in the state
court, by way of certiorari or other procedure, is not in conflict with
the right of protection afforded through the federal courts. It is
only misunderstanding and an ill-advised aroused public feeling that
causes unwarranted and unfortunate statements as to the 'assumed
jurisdiction' and 'misrepresentation of power by the federal courts.'
"If the lawyers who understand the principles of rate making
and the review by courts would spread the information to the public
and particularly to the newspapers, much would be done in standing
by the Constitution which has been so protected over a long period
of years the rights of a citizen in guaranteeing protection of life,
liberty and property."
